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MAOISM AND THE YOUTH MOVEMENT

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This brochure is about the youth movement in China, Maoist activities to isolate the Chinese youth organizations and "re-indoctrinate" the country's young people, and about Peking's attempts to split the international youth movement.

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1. The Youth Movement in China: How It Emerged and Took Shape

The progressive youth movement in China emerged about 50 years ago. Greatly influenced by the 1917 Socialist Revolution in Russia, China's most progressive young people adopted the ideas of scientific socialism. Shortly after the Revolution Russia declared its fraternal solidarity with China's working people. In July, 1919, the Soviet Government, the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Federation headed by Vladimir Lenin, issued a message to the Chinese people and the governments of South and North China which said: "We bring the peoples liberation from the oppression by foreign bayonets, from the oppression by foreign gold, which stifle the oppressed peoples of the East, the Chinese people among them being stifled in the first place. We bring aid and support not only to the working classes of our own but also to the Chinese people."¹ The his-

¹ *Sovetsko-Kitaiskiye otnosheniya. 1917-1957* (*Soviet-Chinese Relations*). A Collection of Documents, Moscow, 1959, p. 43.

tory of the youth movement in China is closely connected with the history of the Chinese Young Communist League. By the early 1920's it had become the vanguard of the country's revolutionary youth which played an important role in the national-liberation movement of the Chinese people.

The Congress of the Revolutionary Youth of the Far East and the First Congress of the Revolutionary Organizations of the Far East held in Moscow in early February, 1922, had a great bearing on efforts to set up a united revolutionary organization of China's youth. The Congress of the Revolutionary Youth of the Far East was attended by delegates from China's first socialist youth unions.

Their leaders were Chang Tai-lei, Chu Chiu-po, Yun Tai-ying, Teng Chung-hsia and Tung Pi-wu, to name just a few, who later became prominent leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. It was these leaders who rallied the country's progressive youth and decided to hold a congress so that the youth movement could take shape as an organization. And it was the First All-China Congress of the Socialist Youth Union that founded a united organization of the country's revolutionary youth.

The First Congress opened on May 5, 1922, and this day is rightfully considered the birthday of the Chinese Young Communist League. Marxism-Leninism became the basis of the League's activities. The First Congress also adopted a programme of action which stipulated that the new youth association was an organization of China's young workers fighting for the complete liberation of the Chinese working class and for building a communist society. The

Congress, guided by the principle of working class internationalism, decided that China's Socialist Youth Union should join the Young Communist International led by the 3rd Communist International.

China's Socialist Youth Union held its Second National Congress in Nanking in 1923.

During a revolutionary upsurge in China the Union held its Third Congress in Shanghai in January, 1925. At that time it was decided to rename the organization to the Chinese Young Communist League. It was more than just a mere change of name. It was a new victory for Marxist-Leninist ideas, a proclamation by the revolutionary Chinese youth that theirs was a communist organization. The declaration adopted by the Third Congress pointed out that it was necessary for the "Chinese youth to realize the strength of the working class and to believe in it."¹

The YCL became a reliable helper of the Chinese Communist Party in its efforts to organize the struggle against the oppressors. The Young Communists also joined the armed struggle against the reactionary militarist forces. On its part, the Communist Party of China and its finest representatives and leaders like Chu Chiu-po and Li Ta-chao paid much heed to the youth movement and helped it in every way. The YCL also received aid and support from the Soviet youth and the Young Communist Leagues of other countries.

¹ See B. A. Milbreit. *Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskogo soyuza molodezhi Kitaya* (Essays on the History of the Chinese Young Communist League), Moscow, 1961, p. 43.

The revolutionary movement in China was developing against heavy odds. Reactionary coups in Shanghai, Kwangchow and other cities in 1927, were accompanied by massacres of communists, YCL members and revolutionary democrats and by a violent anti-Soviet campaign. The right-wing forces led by Chiang Kai-shek called for a war against the Soviet Union. They claimed that "red" imperialism was more dangerous than "white" imperialism. Incidentally, in the early seventies Mao Tse-tung "developed" these Chiang Kai-shek ideas to advance the so-called concept of the "two superpowers," which is now widely propagated by the Maoist leadership.

The facts of history show, however, that anti-Sovietism and the attempts of the Chinese nationalists to set their country against the Soviet Union primarily weakened the positions of China herself. That was exactly the case in the thirties when the Kuomintang government broke off relations with the Soviet Union. China was faced with the direct threat of colonial enslavement by militarist Japan.

During the anti-Japanese war the Chinese YCL members fought heroically against the invaders to defend Shanghai and other cities. Young Communists accounted for more than one-third of the Chinese Red Army. In 1933, the YCL Central Committee formed a special division named after the Young Communist International which acquitted itself with honour on the battlefield.

When Mao Tse-tung assumed leadership in the Chinese Communist Party in 1935, an attempt was made to turn the Chinese Young Communist League by decree into a youth or-

ganization of resistance to Japan and of national salvation. In effect it meant the dissolution of the YCL. Since a united youth organization of resistance to Japan was never set up, in 1941, the Chinese Communist Party, realizing the importance of an organized youth movement, pointed to the need to revive the YCL.

Then came September 2, 1945, when militarist Japan announced her unconditional surrender. The major contribution made by the Soviet Union to Japan's defeat also had a direct bearing on the Chinese people's struggle against the aggressor. Yet peace did not come to China at that time. On orders from Chiang Kai-shek the Kuomintang troops launched an offensive against the Chinese People's Liberation Army. They were backed by the imperialist forces in every way, and by the end of 1945, civil war had spread to eleven provinces.

It was the Soviet Union that came to the help of the Chinese people as a reliable hinterland for the United Democratic Army (the name the armed forces of the Chinese Communist Party in Manchuria went by then). Soviet assistance enabled the party to build up the Army and launch an offensive against the Kuomintang forces. A great deal of area was liberated.

In the meantime, China's youth organization was also taking shape. The process ended in April, 1949, when the New Democratic Youth League came into being. Its members took part in the fighting against the Kuomintang Army, rebuilt the economy in the liberated areas and initiated a movement for exemplary labour.

The League opened its First National Congress in Peking on April 11, 1949. The delegates represented 190 thousand members—workers, stu-

dents, office employees and peasants—the young people of revolutionary China. On the basis of Lenin's report to the Third Congress of the Russian Young Communist League, the forum appealed to the Chinese youth to combine studies and learning Marxist-Leninist theory with concrete practical work and struggle. At this forum the New Democratic Youth League took final shape as the successor to the YCL and elected its leading bodies. The delegates also adopted the League's Charter and Programme defining the organization's character, tasks and objectives. Organizationally, the League was based on the principle of democratic centralism. All told, the First Congress was a landmark in the life of the young people and of the country as a whole.

China's progressive youth belonging to the League did much to bring the victory of the revolution nearer.

When the People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, 1949, it afforded vast opportunities for the young people to make a worthy contribution. The New Democratic Youth League initiated many valuable undertakings on the labour front. It led the "movement for new records in production," took part in carrying out land reform, in reshaping agriculture along co-operative lines, and in developing virgin lands.

The victory of the revolution in China enabled the League to enter the international scene. Its contacts with the Soviet Young Communist League and like bodies in other countries were developing rapidly. The Chinese youth established ties with the World Federation of Democratic

Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS) and was represented there.

Taking into account the level of the political awareness of its members and the new tasks and objectives facing the People's Republic of China, at its Third Congress in 1957, the New Democratic Youth League decided to rename the organization the Chinese Young Communist League. The League was called upon to do everything in its power to turn China into a prosperous socialist country. The delegates put forward the slogan "To learn from the Soviet Young Communist League, to learn from the Soviet youth," which denoted the desire of the Chinese young people for closer friendship and co-operation with the youth in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In its resolution the Congress stressed that "in keeping with the principles of internationalism the Chinese Young Communist League considers that its lofty duty lies in the cohesion with the Soviet youth and the youth of all the socialist countries."¹

For years the Soviet YCL named after Lenin gave the Chinese youth selfless assistance, sharing its experience and knowledge with them. Eleven thousand Chinese students and postgraduates studied at Soviet colleges and universities. Ten thousand Chinese workers took practical training courses at Soviet factories. Always and everywhere they experienced the Soviet young people's friendly support. Permanent contacts were established between the youth of Moscow and Peking, of Irkutsk Region and the Liaoning Province, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist

¹ *Jenmin jihpao*, May 26, 1957.

Republic and the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region, to mention just a few. Soviet and Chinese youth bodies constantly exchanged delegations.

At that time the Chinese YCL pursued a policy of friendship, co-operation and mutual support. The Chinese young people stood firmly for friendship with the Soviet youth and the progressive youth of other countries, and marched shoulder to shoulder with the fighters against imperialism, colonialism and racism. The Chinese youth were represented at the World Festivals of Youth and Students in Berlin, Bucharest, Warsaw and Moscow. These festivals brought young people of all countries closer together in the struggle for peace and social progress.

The Chinese YCL firmly adhered to internationalist positions in the 1950's. It joined with the Soviet YCL and the Young Communist Leagues of other countries in the fight against militarism and to defend the just cause of the Korean and Vietnamese peoples and the peoples of other countries fighting against imperialism. It called for a ban on nuclear weapons. The Chinese young people, together with progressive youth the world over, worked for world peace under the slogan "Unite to prevent the Hiroshima and Nagasaki raids from ever happening again."

Young progressives throughout the world succeeded in closing their ranks and were actively working against the forces of imperialism and reaction. Part of the credit for this also went to the Chinese YCL, one of the militant components of the progressive youth movement in those years.

II. The Maoist Policy of Isolating Chinese Youth From the International Youth Movement and the Destruction of the YCL in China

The progressive and internationalist trend in China's youth movement did not, however, suit the nationalist group in the country's Communist Party led by Mao Tse-tung. As a result, efforts were stepped up back in the late 1950's to brainwash the younger generation to have blind faith in the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung" and to whip up nationalist feeling as a substitute for internationalism. There were endless campaigns to study Mao's works.

Mao Tse-tung and his followers realized that they could not impose a nationalistic policy on the Chinese YCL without first discrediting its internationalist ideology and undermining its ties with like organizations in other countries. To this end, in the early 1960's, the Maoists drastically curtailed the YCL contacts with the Soviet YCL and other Young Communist Leagues. In their own country the Maoists began to spread slander about the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

When the Maoists first began to pursue their "special line," they were set on dominating the world communist movement and did not pay as much attention to the world democratic youth. But after they had conducted numerous purges in the YCL in the early 1960's to remove the leaders they did not like, and once it be-

came clear that the world communist movement rejected the Mao group's claims to leadership, the Maoists went in a big way for splitting activities among the youth all over the world. The idea was to impose Maoist concepts both on the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students and their member organizations. The Maoist leaders stopped at nothing, resorting to crude falsifications, sending their agents to world youth forums and demanding that their "credentials" be accepted.

For instance, a youth delegation sent from Peking to the World Solidarity Forum of Youth and Students in Moscow in 1964, bitterly attacked the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It tried to prevent resolutions being passed on such problems as disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons and even on the elimination of colonialism. Although the Chinese youth delegates paid lip-service to the effort to smash colonialism in Africa, as stipulated in one section of the main resolution, they strongly opposed the part calling for the elimination of the Portuguese and British colonial domains in Asia.

Supporting the Maoist great-power ambitions the delegation used the Forum to attack the delegates from the socialist countries and other progressive forces. The Chinese demanded that the question of colonialism in Asia be removed from the agenda altogether. By this action the "phrasemongering revolutionaries" from Peking gave outright support to the colonialists. They were "indignant" about the fact that the world progressive youth demanded freedom for all peoples, including the Chinese still under colonial rule with Peking's tacit consent.

The Chinese delegates crudely distorted the essence of the resolution on the elimination of colonialism to level an absurd charge against the youth forum. They claimed that the resolution amounted to "interference in China's domestic affairs and encroachment on her sovereignty."

Ten years have passed since the Forum. And now, as before, China is reluctant to change the status of Macao, a former Portuguese colony, despite the fact that the new government of Portugal has granted freedom to all its colonies.

The forum, however, rejected the Maoist contentions. The vast majority of the delegates resolutely advocated stamping out colonialism everywhere.

Although the Maoists lost out at the forum, they never gave up. They sought to split the democratic youth movement and began to knock together pro-Maoist organizations. Meanwhile, the Peking leaders, in a bid to win over part of the world youth, tried to play a Trotskyite card. They began to laud the young people, claiming that it was the young people and only the young people who "accept revolutionary ideas before anyone else and begin to spread them."¹

But this extolling of the youth did not mean much. While praising its revolutionary role to the skies, the Maoists were in no way inclined to step up its activities in the revolutionary struggle. They sought to subordinate the youth to their influence and turn it against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and against

¹ *Jenmin jihpao*, April 24, 1964.

the communist parties of Western Europe and other parts of the world.

But the Maoists failed to do so. The only thing the Peking leaders managed to do was to isolate China's young people from the world democratic youth movement and from the youth in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. By 1966, the Chinese youth were almost completely isolated. They were barred from taking part in the activities of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students, and all contacts with the vast majority of their member organizations were broken off.

By isolating the Chinese youth from the world democratic youth movement Peking was able to deal crushing blows to the YCL and other youth bodies later on. The Maoists began to purge the YCL and other youth bodies as soon as the isolation drive got under way. They felt that this way it would be easier for them to deal summarily later on with those who disagreed with Mao's anti-socialist line.

Naturally, the spread of the personality cult in China was bound to arouse the resistance of party and YCL workers who had gone through the crucible of class battles and were true Marxist-Leninists. But this resistance was weakened by a number of factors. Firstly, it was undermined by Mao's policy to increase party membership dramatically by bringing in petty bourgeois elements in the main and, in particular, a mass of illiterate peasants who were awestruck by the "leader's" role. Actually, the drive carried on the policy started by Mao back in the 1950's. For instance, between 1950 and 1956 the Chinese Communist Party nearly doubl-

ed its membership (from 5,821,604 to 10,739,384). The YCL membership grew at an even faster rate, and between 1950 and 1956 the number of the Young Communists increased more than seven-fold, from three to 23 million. Of course, this was also reflected in the social makeup of the YCL. Secondly, the resistance to Mao's line was also weakened by mass reprisals although the Maoists went to great lengths to conceal them. For instance, 3,600,000 people¹ were killed between 1953 and 1957. And although there is no information as to how many of the victims were communists or YCL members, the subsequent trend of events showed that the percentage was rather high.

The people in China will long remember the rampant hounding of communists in those years on instructions from above. One of the eyewitnesses, Y. Kosyukov, describes the torture of the First Secretary of the Tientsin Communist Party City Committee, Wan Hsiao-tang. The incident was typical of the reactionary shakeup that took place in China between 1966 and 1969 and which the Maoists cynically describe as a "cultural revolution."

In the early morning of September 18, several dozen hungweipings intoxicated with "Mao's thought" broke into Wan Hsiao-tang's flat. They belonged to the "Red Banner" and "Spark" organizations and an industrial technical school. Though Wan was in bed with a high fever, this did not stop the rabid teenagers. They dragged the very sick man out of bed and hauled him to the open grounds of the Sports Palace to

¹ *Maoism bez maski (Maoism Unmasked)*, Moscow, 1970, p. 93.

what was described as a "meeting to fight against those vested with power and following the capitalist road." Shouting "Smash the doghead of the black bandit Wan!" they spat in his face and showered him with rotten pears. Then a refined, savage torture began. The Maoist rowdies made Wan Hsiao-tang sit in the scorching sun with a bent head and kept him in this position for seven hours without a drop of water. And all along the sick man heard the bellow of many voices, shouting "dadao," which means "down."

"You are going to stay here till the end of the meeting," the teenage ringleaders threatened him. And they kept their word. Only when the crowd broke up, were the relatives and friends allowed to take Wan Hsiao-tang away. He was barely alive then and died shortly afterwards.

The charge against Wan Hsiao-tang was that under his leadership the Tientsin City Committee "had followed the revisionist Peking City Committee of the Communist Party and acted as a branch of it at all times and in all places, in industry, agriculture and ideology." He was also accused of adopting "a capitalist stand" and of opposing "the line of proletarian cultural revolution represented by Chairman Mao from the outset." Last but not least, it was claimed that he "had torpedoed the movement for the study of Mao's works," "violently attacked the revolutionary ranks," and "acted counter to the instructions of Mao Tse-tung."¹

¹ From the leaflet of a combat group at the Nankai University School of Economics of September 7, 1966.

When the local Chinese press reported the death of Wan Hsiao-tang, it, however, failed to mention the real cause of his death. For instance, *Tientsin Evening News* claimed that "Wan Hsiao-tang had died on September 19, 1966, after a grave and prolonged illness. He was 49."¹

The clash of two trends within the Chinese Communist Party, internationalism versus nationalism (Maoism) was immediately reflected in the YCL. Whenever the struggle within the party intensified, it was immediately echoed in the League in the regular purges of the leaders and rank-and-file members.

The first major purge of the YCL began in the spring of 1957, and lasted for two years. It was preceded by a statement made by Mao Tse-tung at a Supreme State Conference on February 27, 1957, in which he outlined his theoretical programme. The speech was entitled "On the Question of Resolving Contradictions among the People Correctly." It marked the beginning of the so-called "movement to rectify the style," that is, to purge the party.

According to the Chinese press, as a result over 900 thousand local YCL organizations out of the total of 920 thousand were purged or "set right." Nine million Young Communists out of the total of 24 million were punished in one way or another.² Among those labelled "right-wing" elements were Chen Mo, a member of the YCL Central Committee and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the *Chung Kuo Ching Nien pao* youth newspaper, Chen Tsung-hsu, a member of the YCL

¹ Y. Kosyukov. *Pekinsky dnevnik* (The Peking Diary), 1968, p. 37.

² *Hsingtao jihpao*, Hsiang Kang, September 18, 1970.

Central Committee and of the Central Committee Bureau, who was also the manager of the *Ching Nien paoshe* youth publishing house, and Li Kang, Deputy Manager of the *Chung Kuo Ching Nien* publishing house. The list makes it clear that the Maoists sought above all to put out of action the ones engaged in ideological work and connected with the mass media. One of the full-time functionaries at the YCL provincial committees removed from office was Tung Hsueh-lung, Deputy Secretary of the Yunnan Provincial Committee. Many others were also sacked. There were cases when over ten per cent of the members of the local YCL branches were labelled "right-wing elements."¹

Last but not least, the YCL was also weakened because the membership was not kept completely in the know as to the situation in the party, Young Communist and government bodies. As a result, many party and YCL members could not grasp what was going on. This situation dampened their ardour and sowed seeds of mistrust among them.

In January, 1962, China's YCL organizations began to re-register its members. Assessing the work done during the first months, the national daily *Jenmin jihpao* had to admit on August 28, of that year that "although the Chinese YCL has spent two months on re-registering its members, one-third of the Young Communists failed to complete the formalities of the re-registration and one-tenth of the Young Communists were still unwilling to re-register." This complaint speaks for itself. Apparently, part of the young

¹ *Hsingtao jihpao*, Hsiang Kang, September 18, 1970.

people had by that time realized the disastrous nature of the "great leap" and the "communization" of agriculture and had decided to quit the YCL. A considerable section of the growing generation refused to join the League because its policy accorded less and less with the desires and aspirations of the progressive Chinese youth.

This situation created considerable difficulties for the Chinese leaders since they realized only too well that if they persisted in their policy, it would completely destroy the youth organization which they felt would not be in their interests at that stage. One of the Chinese newspapers observed at that time that "if an appropriate number of new members is not admitted to the Young Communist League every year, three things will happen: (a) there will be less people joining than quitting and in this case the League will deteriorate and its organization will be weakened; (b) if many of the League members grow too old for it, it will cease to be a youth organization; (c) it could happen that these over-age members will make up the majority in the communes, factories, districts, cities and even in larger areas."¹

The Maoist leadership, both in the centre and in the provinces began to look for ways of replenishing the League's ranks to rectify the sad state of affairs that had developed on the eve and during the regular YCL national congress. The directives from the centre insisted that the bulk of the League membership should be young people under 20 with girls accounting for 40 per cent of the total. Villages were sup-

¹ *Chung Kuo Ching Nien*, April 2, 1964.

posed to become centres for recruiting new members. The task was to get 80 per cent of the production teams in the countryside to have YCL groups of their own by 1965. More members were to be recruited into the YCL in the cities, particularly at schools.¹

The directives also underlined that "in the countryside only 13 per cent of the young people belonged to the YCL and that ten per cent of the production teams did not have a single Young Communist and 30 per cent of them had only one or two each."²

The 9th National Congress of the YCL was held in Peking from June 11th to 29th, 1964, in an atmosphere of boosting the Mao personality cult, pursuing an anti-socialist foreign policy and slandering the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Significantly, in violation of the Charter, the Congress was convened three years later than it should have been. The opening ceremony was attended by Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Chu Te and Teng Hsiao-ping, which shows the importance the Chinese leaders attached to the forum.

The report was made by the First Secretary of the YCL Central Committee Hu Yao-pang. The Congress revised the main sections of the YCL Charter. Previously the Charter had stipulated, for instance, that "Marxism-Leninism is the organization's theoretical foundation." The revised version claimed, however, that it was "Mao's ideas" that constituted the ideological

¹ *Chung Kuo Ching Nien*, April 2, 1964.

² *Ibid.*

platform.¹ At the Congress the Secretary of the YCL Central Committee, Hu Ko-shih, stressed the fact that the new Charter "clearly asserted the ideas of Mao Tse-tung as the guiding ideology."² Therefore, an unprecedented situation arose whereby "the Chinese Young Communist League, working under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party,"³ as stipulated in the League's Charter, had changed its ideological and theoretical platform. This happened even though for the next five years, until the 9th Party Congress, the Party Rules still stated that the party adhered to Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The former Charter said: "The Chinese Young Communist League, loyal to the principle of proletarian internationalism, shall make every effort to develop and strengthen the cohesion of the youth in the countries belonging to the camp of peace, democracy and socialism led by the Soviet Union."⁴ Instead of this, the new version spoke about the struggle against "modern revisionism."

After the Congress, a countrywide campaign was launched to boost the YCL membership. Eight and a half million people were recruited in 1965 alone. As a result, most of the membership was made up of half-literate, undeveloped people indoctrinated with "the ideas of Mao."

The Maoist policy led to the decline of the YCL activity. Its leaders already lived in an atmosphere of anxiety and fear that bespoke of the impending "cultural revolution."

¹ *Chung Kuo Ching Nien*, 1964, No. 14, p. 26.

² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

³ The Charter of the Chinese YCL adopted at the 3rd Congress of the New Democratic Youth League.

⁴ *Ibid.*

As for the top leadership in Peking headed by Mao Tse-tung, it went all out with the aid of the propaganda media to brainwash the country's youth and make them anti-Soviet. Special attention was given to students and school pupils. The Maoists, playing up anti-Soviet propaganda, began to re-indoctrinate the young people, to change their whole way of thinking while spreading nationalistic and Great Han prejudices.

The basis for the present-day policy of rapprochement with the imperialist forces was set back in the 1950's and 1960's. And attacks on all the progressive forces in the People's Republic of China were also carefully prepared.

The Maoists stepped up their preparations for dealing summarily with the communists and YCL members in China. The "cultural revolution" was in the offing.

III. The Confused Generation

In drawing up plans for destroying the CPC and the entire state system as defined by the Constitution, the Maoists staked mainly on the young people, chiefly students and senior school pupils. And it is noteworthy that in China more than half of them had a bourgeois or petty-bourgeois background. Although the 9th Congress of the YCL adopted the Maoist platform on the whole, Mao Tse-tung had no faith in this organization which stipulated in its Charter that it was a helper and reserve of the Communist Party of China.

What the Maoists needed to smash the Communist Party and administrative bodies of the People's Republic of China was a "new" force not connected with socialism and having no contacts with the party whatsoever. In other words, they needed a movement of their own to oppose the country's progressive forces. Yet it was impossible to form such a movement without fighting against the party, the YCL, or without putting forward new ideas, goals and tasks. Realizing the complexity of it all, Mao Tse-tung appealed to the students and school pupils to step up the struggle against "revisionism."

Shortly afterwards the Maoists began to form their hungweiping and tsaofan gangs.¹ The first of them appeared on the scene at a secondary school attached to the Chinghua Polytechnical Institute in Peking in the second half of May, 1966. Later such gangs appeared at a secondary school attached to Peking University and other places. They were quite a new phenomenon in China's politics. At first they were very small in numbers. Even according to the official Chinese press, there were hardly more than a dozen in every office and they never played a significant role even in their respective departments, to say nothing of national life. It was hard to understand at first who initiated the whole thing but subsequent events and Maoist pronouncements made it crystal clear that they had been set up on Mao's personal initiative. According to the Chinese press, he was the one who fostered the

¹ Tsaofan detachments were made up of former hungweipings. Most of the tsaofans ("trouble-makers") were young office employees, and only a small percentage consisted of young workers. They were politically immature and came to accept chauvinistic ideas.

movement. It took the Maoists more than three months to get it started, to enable the gangs to find their way and go on the rampage.

The "birthday" of these gangs is regarded in the People's Republic of China to be August 18, 1966, the first time that Mao Tse-tung reviewed their parade in Tienanmien Square in an official ceremony. It was then that several men with armbands bearing the inscription "Hungweiping" or "Red Guard" climbed the central reviewing stand and put a "Hungweiping" armband on Mao's arm. "Mao Tse-tung has put on our red armband," the Chinese press wrote at that time, "he endorsed the formation of our units. Chairman Mao is the top military leader of our hungweipings." In reply to the salute of the cheering crowd, Mao uttered this one sentence: "I resolutely support you." By this he gave his personal blessing to the emerging organization of the hungweipings. Incidentally, the documents of the 11th Plenary Meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee, held just before that event, said nothing either about the hungweipings or their organizations, and it is obvious that they were set up without the party's consent. Therefore, on August 18, 1966, Mao Tse-tung "legalized" in a fashion *paramilitary strike units of fanatical school pupils and students specially formed for massive political terror against party, Young Communist and administrative personnel and also to intimidate broad sections of the population.*

In order that the youth would have more time for rioting the Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council of the PRC passed a decision on June 13, 1966, to change the rules of admission to schools of higher learning and

to postpone for six months the enrollment of new students. This move suspended classes not only at colleges and universities but also at secondary and, later, primary schools for more than four years. As a result, between 750 and 800 thousand students and 40 million secondary school pupils were kept out of school. And this was in a country where up to 50 per cent of the population were illiterate. It is also significant that because of the Maoists the vast majority of the students never returned to colleges and universities.

After the hungweipings had emerged in Peking, the Maoists began to form these gangs all over the country, hoping to use them as a strike force against opposition-minded national leaders, the party and YCL members they hated, and the intellectuals. It was Mao's idea to have the hungweipings track down those who resisted his policy and created the semblance of a mass movement "from below." The Maoists also regarded the hungweiping movement as a school to indoctrinate "successors" to Mao's line through young people's involvement in the "cultural revolution." Estimates made in various countries indicate that there were between 30 and 40 million hungweipings in the PRC during the "cultural revolution," and the Maoists did all they could to boost their numbers and have the hungweipings grow "like bamboo after rain."

One of the first steps in this direction was a series of official meetings between the PRC leaders headed by Mao Tse-tung and hungweipings. There were more than ten such meetings between the August and December of 1966.

To cover up their true objectives, the Maoists

dispatched the hungweipings to overcome "four that were obsolete" habits, customs, ideology and culture—and substitute "four that were new." During such "actions" the Maoists nurtured a taste for rioting in the young people. In an August 1, 1965 message to the hungweipings Mao Tse-tung claimed that "riot is a just cause" and that he supported the "rioters." This set off the notorious campaign to wipe out the cultural heritage, to attack the classics and to rename streets, hospitals and schools, etc. The hungweiping programme of action known at that time as "100 points" was a reflection of the universally propagandized Maoist slogans and directives coupled with rampant anarchy and rioting. Some of the 100 points (points 1, 5, 7, 13 and 20) called for boosting Mao's "ideas" to the sky and establishing his cult everywhere. Orders were issued to set up billboards with Mao's quotations all over the country, hang up his portraits and quotations in every home, put up posters and billboards with his quotations in the parks and chant them in the buses, trolleybuses, trams, planes and trains. Every Chinese was told that it was his duty to carry a book with quotations from Mao and study it all the time. All the bicycle riders, motorists and train drivers were instructed to put up slabs with quotations from Mao and his portraits.

To tell the truth, however, the 100 points also contained demands running counter to Mao's "ideas." For instance, point No. 44 reads: "Capitalist sons of bitches receiving wages, listen to this: Until the country was liberated, you were a burden to the people whom you tyrannized. Now you continue to get high wages which are several times and several dozen times as much

as the workers earn. You are bloodsuckers, sucking the blood of the people, you are criminals. We demand that as of September, 1966, you cut down your high pay to what a rank-and-file worker earns. And we forbid those having deposits in the banks to take out even a penny. If you fail to do so, you will have only yourselves to blame, we mean what we say.”¹

In their point No. 51 the hungweipings demanded restrictions on housing for “the capitalist sons of bitches occupying too much housing space,” and that any extra space be taken away from them. Point No. 56 ordered the “capitalist parasites” to give the money they had hoarded to the state and not to squander it. Point No. 48 demanded that all benefits for the “shady elements” at factory level be abolished and point No. 99 suggested fining the whole “black gang.”

The Maoist leaders tried to nip these tendencies in the bud. When Chou En-lai was speaking at a meeting of hungweiping representatives from secondary and higher schools on September 1, 1966, he dwelt specifically on these problems. He pointed out that the hungweipings were not competent to resolve them and that it was up to the Communist Party Central Committee headed by Mao to decide these matters. (The question here concerns privileges for members of the bourgeoisie who received five per cent interest for the capital they invested in enterprises which are now state property. The “cultural revolution” deprived the bourgeois class of these privileges, and therefore the hungweipings’ demand was pointless.)

¹ A leaflet printed by the hungweipings of the “schools of Mao-Tse-tungism” in Peking in the autumn of 1966, former secondary school No. 26.

In late August, after large hungweiping formations came into being (such as the Peking hungweiping headquarters of secondary, specialized and higher schools numbering 90 thousand, the Peking hungweiping patrol unit, etc.), Mao Tse-tung and his followers began to switch them over from the fight against the "four that were obsolete" to "opening fire on the headquarters," that is, to a fight against the City and Provincial Party and YCL Committees. This marked a new period in hungweiping activities.

After September 1, 1966, hungweipings from other cities were officially allowed to come to Peking for what was described as their "link-ups." As the number of the hungweipings grew, the Maoists began to give more clearcut organizational and ideological forms to their groups. Following Chou En-lai's demand "to have a charter consisting of several points," "Rules for the hungweipings" appeared in Peking on September 2, outlining the programme and tasks of the hungweipings and the conditions for the organization of these "Red Guards."

Meanwhile, the Maoists took still another step. They closed down local youth and other newspapers and magazines to deny their opponents one of the main forms of mass propaganda. The *Chung Kuo Ching Nien* magazine and the *Chung Kuo Ching Nien pao* newspaper of the YCL Central Committee were banned in August, 1966, and the ban is still in effect. The Peking City Committee of the YCL was ransacked. Secretaries of the YCL Central Committee had always figured prominently on the lists of those to be subjected to "criticism." More than 100 editorial offices of the magazines and most

of the local and national dailies had been closed down by early September.

As a result, by the end of 1966, the Chinese Young Communist League had ceased to exist. Many of its leading members were persecuted. Other youth bodies were also disbanded at that time. The hungweipings and their senior colleagues, the tsaofans, were gaining strength.

Nevertheless, they failed to represent the Chinese youth movement. They had neither common programmes nor rules and were not united in a single organization.

In retaliation, Mao's political opponents formed hungweiping units of their own hoping to turn the Maoist-imposed forms of struggle against the Maoists themselves and seize leadership in the movement. They also hoped that clashes between various hungweiping groups and the chaos which had begun as a result of the hungweiping actions would compel Mao Tse-tung to give up his schemes. It is known that the Group in charge of the Cultural Revolution (Mao Tse-tung, Chiang Ching and Lin Piao) was opposed by the "hungweiping Patrol Units of the Capital's Eastern District" or the "Eastern Patrol" for short, and by those of the Western District or the "Western Patrol" and also the units of the Haitien area adjacent to Peking University, the "Haitien Patrol." After these units were smashed by the Army and more than 30 of their leaders were arrested,¹ a United Action Committee ("Lientung") came into being to continue the fight against the Group. On one occasion the hungweiping newspaper *Hsin Peita*, (*The New Peking University*) levelled criticism

¹ *Chingkanshan*, December 22, 1966.

at Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. The newspaper was opposed by five hungweiping organizations whose members broke into its temporary editorial office on November 12, 1966, and ransacked the premises. In mid-December the students and lecturers of the Peking Forestry Institute led by Li Hung-shan put out a wall poster saying openly that Mao Tse-tung could not represent the entire leadership of the Communist Party Central Committee and that the role of Lin Piao as a party leader was even more questionable since he had nowhere near the experience of Liu Shao-chi.

The wall poster was headed: "Kick out the Group in charge of the cultural revolution at the Central Committee. Let's carry on the Revolution on our own."

There were many more cases like that. As the number of the hungweiping organizations grew, their differences became sharper. Every school had several hungweiping organizations. For instance there were six hungweiping organizations and several dozen combat groups at secondary school No. 6 in Shanghai. *Jenmin jihpao* complained on April 26, 1967, that there were sharp differences and contradictions between such groupings all the time.

Mao Tse-tung and those closest to him managed, however, to set the mass of the hungweipings against the party and government machinery, the Young Communist League and trade unions, that is, against Mao's political opponents. The hungweipings were told whom to attack and were supplied with appropriate "compromising" documents, including not only a detailed analysis of biographies, articles, speeches and reports, many of which had never been pub-

lished before, but also recordings of telephone conversations and remarks made in the family circle. The hungweipings were granted free travel throughout the country, and between the autumn of 1966 and February, 1967, the Chinese railways carried over 20 million of them. The hungweipings were also provided with hostel accommodation in the cities and some of them even received free clothes and money to pay for their meals. It cost the country between 17 and 24 million yuans on the average to maintain the hungweipings, which made it 0.5 to 0.7 yuans per person a day. Between the last ten days of August and late December, 1966, the sum spent on them was estimated to be between 2,210 million and 3,120 million yuans. In November, the daily spending on the hungweipings in Kwangchow ran into 250 thousand yuans.¹

Such benefits induced many students to join the hungweipings. Later, however, after the active phase of the "cultural revolution" was over and their political opponents were smashed, the Peking leaders began to demand compensation for the upkeep of the hungweipings. Each hungweiping received a bill he or his parents had to pay.

In early 1967, most of the school pupils and students between 9 and 25 years of age belonged to one of the many organizations calling themselves hungweipings. Naturally, in such conditions the "hungweiping movement" could not become a political single whole, and various trends and even gangsters appeared in it.

The rampages of all kinds of "left-wing revo-

¹ G. S. Prybyle. *The Political Economy of Communist China*, Scranton (Pa), 1970, pp. 506-510.

lutionary organizations" became an everyday phenomenon in China. The acute shortage of prime essentials and poor food supply to the urban population were a breeding ground for all sorts of gangs. The black market was flourishing. In late 1966, the prices of such food-stuffs as pork, rice, tomatoes and cucumbers were increased. Bread, rice, vegetable oil, sugar, cotton fabric, shoes and tobacco were rationed. Later meat, vegetables, fuel and kerosene were also rationed. Special tickets were issued even for going to the bathhouse. In 1967, the rations were as follows: cereals, including potatoes and batatas in terms of grain, 12 to 15 kilograms a month per worker, vegetable oil 125 to 150 grams, sugar 140 grams, cotton fabric and clothes between three and seven metres a year per adult depending on the place of residence.

Meanwhile, "Mao's proletarian headquarters" was worried that the hungweipings were getting out of hand. The hungweipings had served their purpose. They had outlived their usefulness and group feeling, parochialism and anarchism became very pronounced in their organizations, which often fought one another. As a result, the Maoists felt they should disband these organizations and replace them with some new loyal forces.

The Maoists took pains to conceal the true state of affairs in China during the "cultural revolution," and part of the capitalist press followed their lead. Some of the capitalist writers took advantage of the events at that time to denigrate the entire period of socialist development in the People's Republic of China.

In those years the Maoists and part of the

capitalist press sought to spread all kinds of tall stories about China and the Chinese youth. Incidentally, they continue to do so, even though such stories prove to be short-lived.

In fact, however, the "cultural revolution" was directed against the Chinese people's socialist gains, against the Communist Party of China and its helper, the Young Communist League. The objective was to establish the personal rule of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters. The Maoists used the misled young people and the Army to deal summarily with those opposed to their adventurous policy. They managed to use the hungweipings as a means of whipping up anti-Soviet hysteria. They needed this violent anti-Sovietism to scale down relations between the People's Republic of China and other socialist countries and to draw closer to the Western imperialist circles.

The present Peking leaders deceived a considerable part of the Chinese youth, especially the school pupils and students, and channelled their energies along destructive rather than constructive lines. Yet it is significant that, while using the hungweipings to promote their interests, the Maoists never trusted them, prevented them from participating in international forums or establishing contacts with the youth organizations of other countries, even with the pro-Maoist ones.

After Mao Tse-tung and his followers had consolidated their position in the country, they dealt with the hungweiping units as brutally as these same units had dealt with those who did not suit the "great helmsman." Such hungweiping leaders as Yao Teng-shan, Nieh Yuan-tzu and others who were riding on the wave

of the "cultural revolution" were later condemned.¹ They were accused of fomenting the riots, earlier sanctioned and even inspired by Mao Tse-tung, and were held responsible for them. Of course, the hungweipings had never dreamed that the ransacking of Party Committees and killings of leading scholars (Nieh Yuan-tzu killed the Vice-Rector of Peking University, Tsui Hsun-kung) would boomerang into brutal reprisals against them.

Although the Maoists did manage to mislead a great part of the Chinese youth, they failed to make the hungweipings and tsaofans a force they could rely on. By 1967 and 1968, more and more hungweipings were coming to realize the disastrous nature of the Peking leaders' policy and their anti-popular line. Under those circumstances the top Chinese leaders began to search for new ways of winning over the rising generation and for new means of controlling the young people.

IV. "Putting the YCL Right": the Aims and Purport

Besides being a staggering blow at China's progressive forces, the "cultural revolution" seriously undermined her economic development. In a bid to stabilize the economy, to build a

¹ During the "cultural revolution" Yao Teng-shan belonged to the May 16 hungweiping organization. He used to be secretary of the Chinese embassy in Indonesia, and when he was expelled from that country in early 1967,

Maoist-style party, and re-open schools and universities, the Maoists had to give serious attention to the youth problems again. They realized only too well that without the aid of the vast force of young workers they would not be able to increase production. Secondly, while reorganizing the party, the Maoists again had to turn to the young people as a source of replenishing the party ranks. And last but not least, Mao Tse-tung still wanted to have the rising generation champion his "ideas", to be a force Maoism could rely on, rather than a force opposing his anti-socialist policy.

A joint editorial appeared in the main daily newspapers *Jenmin jihpao* and *Chiehfangchiun pao* and the *Hungchi* magazine in April, 1968. It formulated what was described as the imperative need to "put right the Chinese Young Communist League both ideologically and organizationally." The editorial also urged the *tsaofans* and *hungweipings* to "overcome their factionalism" and strengthen their "party spirit." On April 26, 1968, the Maoists masterminded the first statement in the press allegedly made by the "proletarian revolutionaries of the YCL Central Committee staff." The statement urged the young people to be always "loyal to Chairman Mao Tse-tung and carry on the cause of the cultural revolution."

he was given a lavish welcome in Peking. He led *hungweipings* in the siege and ransacking of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and took part in besieging several embassies and in setting the British embassy on fire.

Nieh Yuan-tzu was one of the authors of a wall poster called by Mao the "first Marxist-Leninist poster in China." She was closely linked with the May 16 organization.

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In March, 1969, the sign "The Chinese Young Communist League Committee" appeared on the building that used to be the headquarters of the leading bodies of the Peking YCL Committee. Evidently, it was intended to demonstrate that the Maoist youth league had resumed its activities. After that, preparations got under way in various parts of China to set up "YCL organizations." But they ran into major difficulties from the outset.

The chaos created by the "cultural revolution" was far from conducive to forming the organization. A considerable percentage of the former YCL members with experience in organizational work had either been punished or were too old to belong any longer. The brutal disbanding of the YCL in 1966 also discouraged young people. Remembering the rampages of the "cultural revolution," the idea of joining the new organization was not appealing.

For these and other reasons the emergence of the Maoist YCL was a long and painful process, though the Peking leaders kept an eye on it all along. It lasted from 1969 to 1972. When a joint editorial appeared in the national dailies and the *Hungchi* magazine on July 1, 1969, listing the tasks facing the country, one of them was "to put right the Young Communist organizations." The press failed to say how this job should be done and each area went about it differently. For instance, in some regions the authorities began by publishing statements by some of the YCL members. Elsewhere they began to study the situation within the YCL bodies while in still other areas efforts were made to restore YCL organizational activities.

Since the Maoist Communist Party Central Committee feared that the process to rebuild the YCL might get out of hand, it issued a secret document on October 6, 1969, entitled "On the Tasks of the Young Communist League at the Present Stage." This document later became known abroad. It repealed the YCL Charter of 1964, and sanctioned the resumption of the activities of the Maoist YCL in keeping with the new Charter which had still not been drawn up or adopted. According to the document, the new organization was supposed to become the youth vanguard in the study of "Mao's ideas." It recommended that persons who were over the "YCL age" but who "had a good reputation" should be admitted to the party. At the same time the document "simplified" the procedure of admission to the YCL.

At the initial stage members of the YCL organizations were universally required to study "Mao's ideas" and take an active part in every political campaign. It actually meant following Mao's line unquestioningly and fighting against opposition to his adventurous and Great Han policy. In July, 1970, the Communist Party Central Committee issued "A Notice on the Work to Put Right and Build the Young Communist League." The document underlined that while "building the YCL and putting it right, it is necessary to give priority to ideological education." It stipulated that "the building of the YCL... should be turned into a great school of studying and applying the ideas of Mao Tse-tung in a creative manner," that "the unsuitable elements should be removed" and that the YCL should admit "a great mass of progressive youths who came to the fore during the

cultural revolution."

When the Maoist leadership was plunged into the September crisis in 1971, and when Lin Piao and his closest supporters were removed, the building of the YCL was slowed down to a certain extent. The next year the process was noticeably intensified after the closed meeting of the Peking leaders in November. The New Year editorials of the national daily *Jen-min jihpao* and the *Hungchi* magazine, listing the tasks for 1973, put forward the demand "to put right" the YCL organizations all over China and step up the drive to criticize "revisionism."

While the Peking leaders were "revamping" the YCL between 1971 and 1973, they did a lot of manoeuvring and changed their tactics towards the youth many times. Despite the resistance they encountered in various provinces, they were making an all-out effort to turn it into a force they could rely on, a force which would carry on the Maoist cause and loyally support Maoist ideas.

The Peking leaders were unhappy about the fact that many of the newly founded YCL organizations were inactive or "concerned themselves with current affairs of production and paid little attention to the class struggle (meaning the struggle against the opponents of Mao's line.—*Auth.*) and education in the spirit of the line (i.e. in the spirit of Mao's ideas.—*Auth.*)."

According to the Chinese press, 30 per cent of the young people were just nominal YCL members who took no part in its activities, only 20 per cent were relatively "good" and 50 per cent were average. To inject new blood into the YCL, the Maoists recruited "cultural re-

volution" activists into it, hungweipings and educated young people banished to the countryside and mountainous areas. It is estimated that about 5,200,000 were admitted to the YCL between 1969 and 1973 though there are nearly 150 million young people of YCL age in the People's Republic of China.

In a bid to use the YCL as a tool to put up an active fight against their political opponents, the Maoists launched an intensive campaign to recruit people into the League in 1973. And in admission to the party the Chinese leaders continue to give preference to the members of the new Maoist YCL.

Between 1972 and 1973, the effort to "put the YCL right" involved over 95 per cent of the local organizations in the provinces of Chinghsi and Kansu, over 80 per cent of the organizations in Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin and also in the provinces of Heilungkiang and Chilin, to mention only a few. Yet despite this high percentage of involvement, the actual results of the campaign proved to be rather modest. According to the official press, which made "surveys and analyses of the work to put right and build up the YCL," between 1971 and 1972 about 20 per cent of the cells had good results to show in this regard, 50 per cent had average results, 30 per cent made a poor showing, and in some cases it was a mere formality.

Before 1974, the campaign to "put right and build up the YCL" had been regarded as the key element of the entire work with the youth. Special attention was paid to completing the League's organizational structure from top to bottom. The YCL leading bodies in the areas, districts and cities were formed between 1971

and 1972 and in early 1973. In a bid to speed up the "formation" of the YCL committees, the Peking leaders held a series of meetings in 1972. They took place in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Anhwei and Kansu, to name just a few of the many provinces, autonomous regions and cities.

By late 1972, some of the "foremost" provinces had reported to the centre about completing the effort to form YCL cells and committees in their localities. New YCL leading bodies were formed in the areas, districts and cities followed by preparations for provincial congresses.

The YCL Congress in Shanghai opened on February 12, 1973. It was the first meeting of a big YCL body at provincial level following the destruction of the League. Next came congresses in Liaoning, Peking, Chiang-hsi and other places. The campaign of holding such congresses in major cities lasted until August, 1973.

A closer look at them reveals that they were held on the pattern of the party congresses and were carbon copies of them in the level and style. As was the case with the party congresses, the delegates to the YCL gatherings were appointed and not elected although official reports spoke about the "democratic manner" in which the delegates had been chosen. The same principle of "democratic consultations" was used to set up all the YCL committees in the districts, cities and provinces.

The reports read at these congresses were very stereotyped. At the provincial congresses party leaders, in their statements, paid much attention to the new campaign "to criticize re-

visionism and to put the style right" which began in May, 1971. It actually amounted to a new purge in the wake of the "cultural revolution." It was called a campaign of criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius. Along with other things, the purpose of this campaign was to back up the system of educating the Chinese youth which has been in operation since the early 1960's. What is typical of it as a whole is the marked anti-Soviet colouring. The stories reporting the progress of this "criticism" always slander the Soviet Union, its Communist Party and other Communist and Workers' Parties. The Chinese young people are being brainwashed into believing that the Soviet Union is allegedly their "No. 1 enemy." They are urged to adhere firmly to the Maoist line of "preparations in case of war," to develop China's border mountainous areas and set up paramilitary settlements.

The men in Peking approve of the campaign to send educated young people to rural and mountainous areas and hope to continue it. This is evident from the documents of all the YCL provincial congresses and the February, 1973 editorial in *Jenmin jihpao* headed "To Promote Vigorously the Work of the Young Communist League."

The question arises, therefore, where the value of this "experience" lies and what induces the present Chinese leaders to carry on this drive.

The new campaign to banish young people from the cities began immediately after Mao Tse-tung issued his instructions to this effect on December 22, 1968. According to the Chinese press, over eight million youths were sent

out of the cities during five years since then, while specialists on China put the figure at 25 million.

The drive to banish young people from the cities to the countryside shows that the masterminds of the "cultural revolution" want to rid the cities of the force they used rather successfully in their struggle for power. A leading communist, Wang Ming, member of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee of the 8th convocation, a man who represented the party in the Communist International, once observed that "the Mao group sends millions of young people to remote, sparsely populated areas and villages to keep them from staying in the cities and being able to riot against Mao Tse-tung and his followers who had come up with the slogan that 'riot is a just cause.'"

The Chinese leaders are also banishing young people from the cities to avoid having to provide educated young people in town with jobs. The point is that the factories and offices in big cities cannot absorb all those graduating from schools, colleges or universities since Mao Tse-tung's anti-socialist policy is aimed at curtailing the construction of civil projects. Besides that, there is the strict food rationing in big cities to contend with. In 1972, the harvest in China was less than for the previous year and, naturally, it affected the entire population, especially the city dwellers. In 1973, news came from China that food prices had gone up 30 to 60 per cent.

What is more, by sending young people to border and remote areas Peking wants to step up the drive to assimilate the local population, in particular, in the areas inhabited by nation-

al minorities. The main objective is to tip the balance in favour of the Hans (Chinese) and sharply increase the number of inhabitants there. This policy is particularly evident in Inner Mongolia, the Sinkiang-Uigur autonomous region, and Tibet, to mention just a few areas.

According to the refugees who fled to the Mongolian People's Republic from the Shilingol district of Inner Mongolia, the drive to settle young Hans there has been particularly intensified in the past few years. Up to ten thousand Chinese were moved to every city. Every commune received a thousand, and every team a hundred, Chinese.¹

To assimilate the Mongols, marriages between young Chinese and Mongols have been encouraged of late while marriages between local Mongols are banned. The Chinese resent Mongols speaking their own language and mock the Mongolian minority.

By sending young people to the countryside Mao Tse-tung and his supporters would like to intensify surveillance over local functionaries, party and YCL members and the entire population in the given area. Now that mutual reporting is becoming obligatory the Peking leaders hope that the experience of the hungweipings and tsaofans will help them to cope with any possible opposition.

To keep young townspeople in the countryside, the Chinese press keeps claiming they have good prospects there. Work is promised to all graduates from technical and agricultural schools and colleges. But the reports that sometimes do appear even in the national press

¹ *Utga Dzohiol Urlag*, September 3, 1973.

tell a different story. They show that the banished young people have little scope for applying their knowledge. A case in point is the "exemplary areas" of the Yen-an type where more than 20 thousand young people have been banished from Peking. *Jenmin jihpao* reported on September 28, 1972, that 75 per cent or 15 thousand young people of both sexes were misemployed and doing all kinds of odd jobs.

And such things happen in a country where half of the population is illiterate and where there is an acute shortage of skilled personnel in the national economy.

This resettlement campaign was launched in 1968, and regular appeals are made to step it up. It differs from the previous ones because young people are sent to rural areas not temporarily, for 2 or 3 years, but for good. The new drive has assumed vast scope. Foreign press agencies estimate that more than 30 million people were banished from 1964 to the first half of 1973.

This policy towards the youth is giving rise to widespread discontent. Young people feel compelled to pick up and emigrate. Twenty-eight thousand fled to Hong Kong in 1972 alone. Reports from Hong Kong say that the same year up to 100 young Chinese a month swam across the two bays separating China from Hong Kong.

Most of the refugees from China are young people driven to despair by harsh living conditions, in particular in the countryside where they are banished.

Some time ago a Western publication carried a confession by a 23-year-old Chinese who

once had been proud of being a member of the hungweiping organization. When the drive began to push the "Red Guards" out of the picture and young people were banished to rural areas, he found that the work was hard, that food was scarce and that he could no longer continue his studies. He worked not far from Hong Kong and managed to escape.

The people who were compelled to emigrate are very unhappy about having to do so and keep hoping against hope that they might return home some day. But at present life in China is more than they can endure. A former postgraduate student at a Chair of the History of Literature, Ting Sheng-hsi, had this to say about this life. "I did not know what it was like to be a slave until I found myself in a labour re-indoctrination camp. They would wake us up at 4 o'clock in the morning and drive us into the fields under guard. We had to work there 15 to 16 hours. After work we were driven to 'political classes' where we were supposed to confess our 'sins,' denounce ourselves and extol the 'wisdom of Chairman Mao' and praise him for taking care of our future."¹

Yet it makes you wonder how great this care is in general and, in particular, in such a field as the young people's education.

Classes were partially resumed at last in 1970 at the universities and institutes of technology and natural science. And liberal arts faculties and colleges were reopened the following year. Studies at primary and secondary schools were also restored to a certain extent. But the new

¹ *Pravda*, February 11, 1972.

system of education can in no way meet the needs of science or industry. The period of training in the day departments has been reduced from 4-5 years to the bare minimum of 2.5-3 years. The Chinese students are told nothing about the latest developments in world culture, science or technology. Nothing is said about the achievements of the socialist countries, the life and struggle of the youth. Only distorted information is given.

The best that has been created by mankind throughout its long history was declared "revisionist goods" in Peking. Even the works of the world-famous Chinese writers have been withdrawn from bookshops and libraries.

Just what did China get from the Maoist experiments in the educational field, a country whose leaders confess that she is in dire need of skilled personnel and of people who could simply read and write? Here are just a few facts and figures.

The 12-year programme to eliminate illiteracy by 1967 mapped out at the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China fell through. China's schools of higher learning graduated only 29 thousand people in late 1973 as against 170 thousand who finished higher school under a normal curriculum in 1965. Some reports say that only 100 colleges and universities are open out of the total of 700 which functioned in 1965. Considering that the colleges and universities will be able to return to normal studies only by 1975 (that was the opinion of the foreign experts who did not take into account the current events in China), it becomes evident that the country is going to miss 10 college graduations.

The demagogical approach of opposing political to professional knowledge—which goes back to Mao's pronouncements made long before the "cultural revolution"—only confuses the young people.

A typical product of Maoism is Liu Li-hua, a girl student, who entered college after finishing primary (!) school and eight years of work on a farm. Naturally, her knowledge was well below the college standards. "When we studied classical literature," she said, "the lecturer demanded that we render the text in colloquial Chinese, and since I had never studied such things, I couldn't do it." She felt that the main purpose of entering college was not to learn things but to "lead the university and reform it in line with the ideas of Chairman Mao." During her two years at college Liu Li-hua, in her own words, was chiefly engaged in "public affairs and attending various functions after classes which consumed much of her time" and she couldn't cope with her studies. She attacked the lecturers who tried to "suppress her activity (and that of the students like herself) with the aid of examinations" and the students who "spent more time in the library than she had done and devoted all their time to studies, took little interest in Great Criticism, and were in no hurry to put out wall posters" which she claimed made the lecturers partial to them.

The story of 12-year-old Huang Shuai is a typical case of how the Maoists use young people for their own purpose. Peking's propaganda machine has been praising the girl for quite a long time. In December, 1973, the national press carried letters and fragments from the diaries of this fifth-former. She criticized the

"indisputable authority" of her teacher who allegedly clamped down on her in every way for that and once even went so far as to forbid her to play basketball for misbehaviour. In the best traditions of the demagogic phraseology used during the "cultural revolution" the fifth-former described the teacher's actions as "suppression of democracy." The authorities fully backed her, declaring she was putting up a courageous struggle to destroy the "revisionist" respect for the teacher.

Later 12-year-old Huang Shuai went on from criticizing her teacher's "revisionism" to attacking Lin Piao and even Confucius. She argues with those who disagree with what she is doing by claiming that a person who fails to applaud the revolution in education has a bourgeois outlook. And in present conditions this charge is pretty serious, to say the least. Her "experience" is being studied at schools, colleges and universities and army units. Chinese propaganda is urging people to follow her example in "swimming bravely against the current."

The Maoists are brainwashing and misleading the Chinese young people so as to keep using them to promote their own selfish interests. Yet they are failing in the main thing—they still cannot fully rely on the youth. More and more young people, including former hungweipings and tsaofans, are coming to realize the disastrous nature of the Peking leaders' policy and their anti-popular line. Of course, this is bound to trouble the Maoists.

They do not trust the Young Communist League. Although the documents of the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party do mention the League, very little is done to com-

plete its formation. According to some sources, by the 25th anniversary of the People's Republic of China the Maoists intend to hold an all-China YCL Congress. The congress will be held on the same level as a trade union's congress or a congress of women's organizations. A struggle is now under way among the leaders as to who should head the YCL organizations. Meanwhile the Young Communist League organizations in the provinces are told to work among youth, in particular, to take part in the campaign of banning young people to the countryside.

The Maoists keep fighting to bolster up their position and do not spare those who differ with them, the people who are concerned about China's future. And in this struggle the Maoist leadership has no need for an integrated national youth organization based on socialist principles and taking an active part in building a socialist China. What they would like to have is a loose association without any clearcut organizational principles or long-term objectives. That is why the Maoist leaders are playing for time and delaying the formation of a national Young Communist League.

And there is more to it than that. The question of setting up the so-called leading revolutionary nucleus is a ticklish one since all issues related to personnel are extremely difficult under the circumstances. First of all, most of the present-day functionaries lack knowledge and experience for work in the YCL. It is said that if you cope with your work there, no one is going to say "thank you" for that, and if you fail, there will be no end of trouble. This view seems to be widespread among the leading officials.

The Peking leaders complain that some people "shirk difficulties and do not want to work after they have been criticized." Yet the Maoist ruling set goes to great pains to conceal what causes such an attitude.

The Maoists, however, cling to the idea of setting up a docile national youth body under the old name. The Peking leaders hope that this organization will help them to control the huge mass of the Chinese young people and educate the rising generation in the spirit of "Mao's ideas," hatred for the Soviet Union and hostility to the world progressive and democratic youth movement. The Mao group hopes that this organization will become an obedient tool they can use against the Chinese youth, its finest sons and daughters. To this end the Maoists are using every means they have, including the Army, and do not stop at violating the basic standards of democracy. They deny the Chinese people not only the right to an education, creative labour, rest and leisure but also the right to have progressive organizations of their own, to take an active part in building socialism and co-operating with the world progressive youth.

V. The Fight Against the World Democratic Youth

The Peking leaders are leaning over backwards to make the Chinese young people forget the ideals of scientific communism and aban-

don democratic progressive views, and to undermine their internationalist traditions. China's youth has not taken part in any anti-imperialist campaign since the mid-1960's. For ten years now the Maoists have forbidden the young Chinese to celebrate such dates as International Students Day, International Youth Solidarity Day, etc. The Chinese young people are unable to hold a single meeting to express solidarity with the Chilean people.

The "silence" of the Chinese young people is a tragedy. It is the outcome of the policy pursued by the Peking leaders who have denied millions upon millions of China's youths the right to speak out, the right to support the revolutionary struggle of people their age in other countries.

While isolating China's youth from the outside world, the Maoists are keeping a sharp eye on the world youth movement. Peking is keenly watching youth activity in Western Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas since it is making every effort to use the youth movement to promote its great-power policy. The Maoists hope to divert it, at least some sections of it, from fighting for greater democracy and against monopoly rule to fighting against the organized working class and communist movements, against the "superpowers," by which they actually mean the Soviet Union.

Since the late 1960's, the Maoist leaders have been pursuing a two-fold policy. On the one hand, they have been trying to set up pro-Maoist youth leagues in the capitalist and developing countries by banding together all kinds of extreme revolutionary groups under the banner of "Mao's ideas." On the other hand, they have

been taking pains to cut off the youth movement from the main revolutionary forces both by setting it against these forces and by pushing it into adventurous actions.

To cover up their schemes for domination, the Maoists put forward all kinds of pseudo-revolutionary slogans to capitalize on the youth struggle against imperialism while seeking to divert the young people from this struggle. What they really want is to turn the youth against the Soviet Union. During the "cultural revolution" Peking, using its traditional methods, tried, not without success, to stir up riots in Sri Lanka, India, Burma, Cambodia, Nepal and the Philippines. In Africa and Latin America the Maoists in a number of cases have succeeded in setting up pro-Peking groups which impeded the progress of the revolutionary struggle. All told, the Maoists have formed pro-Peking youth groups in more than 50 countries. Between 1968 and 1969 they managed to set up a number of pro-Peking groups among the students of the Western countries, the groups that mainly consisted of people with a petty-bourgeois background. They were ultra-revolutionary anarchist groups. During the student actions in France in May and June of 1968, their number more than doubled. They concentrated on whipping up political tension in that country and foiling the joint actions of youth and the working class.

The policy of ruling circles in the West European countries has also helped these groups to build up their strength to a certain extent. These circles regarded the pro-Maoist organizations as an additional means of fighting against the democratic forces. For their part, the Peking lead-

ers, taking into account the policy of the ruling classes in the capitalist countries, helped to set up youth groups connected with the so-called "Marxist-Leninist parties" obediently toeing their line. For instance, the Rote Garde group was formed in conjunction with the "Marxist-Leninist party of Germany" in Federal Germany. A so-called "Communist Student Union" emerged in West Berlin, while in the Scandinavian countries there were a number of these groups, including the Socialist Youth League of "Marxist-Leninists" in Norway and the Klarhet youth group in Sweden. The Red Star and Brigade rosse groups emerged in Italy, and in India there appeared the Student Co-ordinating Committee of Revolutionary Communists.

A feature of all these pro-Maoist groups, including the youth organizations, is the blatant anti-Sovietism that colours their views and concepts. And all they do is to stage provocations harming the working class movement, the strike movement and the student struggle for greater democracy in the universities. Inevitably, these groups ally themselves with anti-democratic, anti-socialist forces and, as for the authorities, they use the disturbances provoked by Maoist groups as a pretext for victimizing the democratic forces, the communist parties and trade unions above all. This was exactly what happened in Italy, Federal Germany, Canada and other countries.

Yet in the late sixties and early seventies it became clear that the pro-Peking groups had no chance to win their bid for leadership in the youth movement. They began to fall apart rapidly, and their disintegration was accelerated by the change in Peking's tactics after the 9th Con-

gress of the Communist Party of China. It not only gave up most of its "ultra-revolutionary" slogans but also started to develop unprincipled relations with imperialist powers very rapidly at the expense of the revolutionary forces. What is more, since the Chinese leaders are out for world hegemony and linking up with the forces of imperialism and reaction and supporting NATO, in a number of cases they simply betrayed their supporters. For instance, the Maoists sold out some of their groups in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America when the need arose to normalize relations with the governments of the respective countries.

The young people abandoned by Peking are only now coming to realize that they were mere pawns in the hands of the Chinese leaders. As a result, the youth have turned away from the "ultra-revolutionary leaders." In France the National Union of Students was restored to its leading role back in the summer of 1970. The Union advocates an alliance with all the democratic forces in the country and, in the first place, with the World Federation of Trade Unions. The French workers and youth repelled the Maoists and other leftists in a fitting style. There have been similar developments in Italy, Federal Germany and Sweden, to mention just a few countries, and this trend indicates that the Maoists and their sponsors in Peking are losing ground.

The Chinese leaders realize this very well, and they are compelled to manoeuvre. For tactical reasons they stopped criticizing the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDU) and the International Union of Students (IUS) and are pursuing a selective policy towards the

youth organizations of the socialist countries. In the early 1970's the Maoists established contacts with the youth bodies in Albania, the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. China even sent its representatives to attend a National Conference of Chilean Socialist Youth in 1971, and received a Chilean youth delegation in Peking the following year. Yet this did not prevent the Chinese leaders from "forgetting" in 1973 what their representatives had earlier said about friendship and co-operation at that conference. After the fascist junta had come to power in Chile the country's youth did not hear a single friendly word from the "Chinese representatives" in support of the young people's struggle. Nor did the Chinese say a word to denounce the junta's atrocities.

The Chinese also sent an authoritative delegation to the 6th Congress of the Korean Young Socialist Workers' League held in June, 1971. The delegation was led by Kuo Hung-tsch, alternate member of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, who was also Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee in the Anhwei province.

The Chinese leaders are making energetic efforts to expand Peking's ties with the youth and student bodies in the developing countries, Western Europe, Japan and the United States. In doing so, they take a different approach to the youth movement in each country. If China has good relations with a country, she seeks to establish contacts with its youth bodies through government channels only, keeping in touch with those which belong to the ruling coalition. And in the countries where the youth

and student organizations are opposed to the state the Maoists avoid coming into any contact with them so as not to mar inter-state relations. And finally, in the countries which have no diplomatic relations with China, the Maoists are seeking to develop ties with like-minded youth and student bodies.

The Maoist policy towards the progressive youth movements in Israel, Sudan and several other countries is very indicative. While the Peking leaders are establishing contacts with the governments of these countries, they fail to give even moral support to the democratic forces and conceal from the young Chinese the true facts about the activities of the progressive youth organizations there.

The Chinese leadership has established contacts with the American students of Chinese descent in a bid to use them to spread its "concepts" in the United States. The Maoists call them "the Chinese students in the USA sympathetic to the socialist homeland."

Since the Chinese leaders realize the importance of the world democratic youth movement, they go to great lengths to flirt with its organizations. But since the men in Peking do not trust their own youth they make attempts to establish contacts with these organizations through Chinese embassies and the machinery of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.

Peking is obviously disturbed by the current trend in the development of the world democratic youth movement in Western Europe and other areas, and by the growing political activity of the young people who are beginning to fight for social and democratic reforms. Since

broad sections of the youth are taking part in the mass movement for peace and security in Europe and the relaxation of tension, and since they are supporting the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples and their liberation struggle and demanding an end to colonialism and racism in Africa, it all denotes the keen interest of the younger generation in world problems and political affairs. And, naturally, all this drastically narrows the scope of Maoist activity.

The overall political climate in Europe is changing for the better. New prospects are appearing for expanding and activizing the progressive youth and other movements. The credit for this is due to the well-known foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the communist parties and all the democratic forces. Contrary to anti-communist prejudices, the march of life leads the young Social Democrats, Liberals, and Christian Democrats to develop contacts with the youth of the socialist countries and the communist youth organizations in their own countries. Cases in point were the recent conferences of youth and students on European security in Florence and Helsinki. What is more, in many countries several youth bodies formed united national delegations to the 10th World Festival.

The reactionary forces, however, are stepping up their activities in a bid to divide the young people, impede detente and lead the youth movement astray. The idea is to divert it from genuinely revolutionary, progressive ideals. In this situation the subversion of the pro-Maoist organizations in the West European countries is particularly harmful.

Nowadays the Chinese leaders' tactics are based on whipping up any differences within the democratic youth movement. The Maoists more and more resort to demagoguery to lead this movement astray and turn it against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Special emphasis is placed on right-wing nationalism as a trend profoundly hostile to internationalism.

Anti-communism continues to underlie the activities of the small but vocal pro-Maoist groups in Western Europe. Their ideological and political divisions, constant splits and the fallacy of their "concepts" prevent them from taking united action against the democratic youth movement. This does not mean, however, they are no danger to the progressive youth. When an international theoretical seminar was held in Prague in 1973, a delegate from the German Communist Party Georg Kwiatowski had every reason to say that in his country, Federal Germany, "Maoist groups have lately been doing serious harm to the class struggle even though they are operating in only a few cities and their positions in the enterprises and trade unions are rather weak. They reject working class struggle for immediate social and democratic as well as anti-monopoly demands. They describe it as opportunism and try to form an anti-trade union opposition."¹

The pro-Maoist groups are all violently anti-Soviet, regardless of what they are called or the country concerned. Significantly, when the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev was visiting

¹ *World Marxist Review*, No. 11, 1973, p. 27.

Federal Germany in 1973, the Maoist elements staged a number of anti-Soviet provocations there. During the 10th World Festival many pro-Maoists converged on West Berlin where they got together in beer halls, calling for struggle against the Soviet Union and the world democratic youth movement.

The Peking leaders are also using the Maoist groups to spread propaganda against detente, to slander the Soviet Union's foreign policy of peace and the world democratic youth movement. A case in point is a series of publications issued by the youth organizations of "Marxist-Leninists" in Sweden. This group went so far as to describe the 1973 World Youth Festival in Berlin as an "imperialist" venture. Taking their cue from Peking, this organization and its counterparts in other West European countries are opposing the development of East-West relations and trying to intimidate their peoples with a would-be Soviet threat.

Throughout the 1970's Peking and the pro-Maoist groups toeing its line have been manoeuvring and changing their slogans in an effort to find new forms and methods of work. This is evident, among other things, from the reshuffle of these groups in a number of countries. A Maoist group, "New People's Resistance," emerged in France in 1972. The so-called "Young Communist League of Germany" and the "Revolutionary Youth (Marxist-Leninists)" came into being in Tübingen and a number of other cities in Federal Germany. The pro-Maoist youth groups in Norway, Sweden and Italy have been re-organized. Yet all these "new" organizations have the same old objective of fighting against the communist movement and uphold-

ing Peking's interests on the world scene.

The pro-Maoist newspapers such as *Nuova Unità* in Italy and *Clarté et l'exploité* in Belgium, to mention only two, as well as *Jenmin jihpao*, engaged in a violent anti-Soviet propaganda campaign during the Arab-Israeli war in the autumn of 1973. They continued it after the war was over and have been whipping it up ever since in a bid to weaken the positions of the forces of peace and whitewash the policy of aggression and plunder.

The activities of the Maoist organizations in Western Europe are also aimed at splitting the working class. Since the number of foreign workers is growing in the West European countries, the Maoists are trying to play off one section against another, taking advantage of any friction in their midst. The actions of the pro-Peking organization in Sweden are a perfect illustration of such activities. This group is trying to use Yugoslav workers to promote its own interests not only by setting them against the Swedish workers but also by spreading propaganda against the Yugoslav government among them. This group is bitterly opposing detente in Europe and also Sweden's democratic forces. The Yugoslav daily *Borba* had every reason to remark on March 8, 1973, that "the Maoists, losing touch with reality, are coming to resemble the Swedish neo-Nazis more and more in their programme and methods." This is the true face of the Maoists outside China.

The activities of the Maoist organizations and groups and their sponsors are directed against the interests of the West European nations. They continue to play into the hands of imperialism and its most reactionary circles. They

continue to oppose the unity of the youth movement and try to divert it from a consistent anti-imperialist platform. Small wonder that the reactionary press gives their statements wide coverage.

And that is precisely why the progressive youth in the West European countries is coming to oppose the Maoist groups more and more vigorously. When the Spartacus Student Union was holding its 2nd Congress in Hamburg in February, 1973, its President, Christoph Strawe, resolutely dissociated himself from the "ultra-left." In his opening speech he pointed out that they had displayed no sign of anything that might serve as a basis for united action. "The Spartacus Union," he underlined, "will fight an uncompromising struggle against the strategy of chaos these groups are practising." And this standpoint is shared by the French Communist Youth Movement, the Italian Young Communist Federation, the German Young Socialist Workers, the Danish Young Communist League and the rest of the progressive and democratic youth bodies in Western Europe.

When the 17th Congress of the Soviet Young Communist League was meeting in Moscow in April, 1974, it was addressed by Egon Krenz, First Secretary of the Central Council of the Free German Youth, of the German Democratic Republic. He called on the world progressive youth to consolidate its unity, emphasizing that this unity was foiling the intrigues of those, who, like the Peking leaders or Western anti-communists, were trying in vain to split the revolutionary forces of the world. Taking into account the interests of the entire progressive youth movement, the Congress pointed out in

its resolution that the "Soviet Young Communist League should continue to wage an uncompromising struggle against Maoism and the subversive activities of the Chinese leaders in the youth movement."

The world democratic youth is actively working for detente which is opposed by Peking and its followers. It is working for peace and European security which the Maoists are also against. It insists that NATO should be disbanded whereas Peking wants it to continue. It is working for the unity of the young people on an anti-imperialist platform whereas the Peking-sponsored Maoist groups are out to split them. In fact, there is not a single issue on which the Peking leaders and Maoist youth groups would not come out against the interests of the youth movement.

Whether in China or Western Europe, the Maoists have become the outright enemies of the forces of peace and socialism and are trying to put the clock back. And it is not only the interests of the world democratic youth movement that Maoist policy opposes. It is against the interests of the Chinese young people who have been cut off by the Peking leaders from the contemporary progressive forces for years. The young Chinese are cut off from the many-sided and courageous struggle of the world democratic youth under the leadership of the WFDY and IUS against the forces of imperialism, for peace, democracy and social progress throughout the world.

* * *

The Chinese people and their youth are going through difficult times because of the Peking

leaders. The country's Constitution was actually scrapped. The working class and peasants are barred from taking any part in running the country. Such gains as the right to education and free medical aid have been abolished, to say nothing of the right to rest. The Chinese have actually forgotten what it means to rest.

The Maoist policy towards the youth in China and its YCL as well as towards the young people abroad runs counter to their interests. Through the fault of Mao and his followers the young Chinese have been isolated for years from the progressive youth movement and used to undermine the socialist system in the People's Republic of China instead of strengthening it, to fight against socialism, peace and progress instead of against the forces of imperialism. The tragedy of the Chinese YCL and youth in general is the tragedy of Chinese society as a whole which is now paying for the adventurism and great-power ambitions of the Maoists.

Even so, the Maoists have failed to win over all the young Chinese. Far from that. Opposition to the Peking leaders is mounting. This is evident from the continuing conflicts, divisions and purges among the top leaders in Peking, from the extremely slow process of forming the YCL and from the growing discontent of those young people who have been banished from town to mountainous and rural areas. Last but not least, this is evident from the fact that the Maoists have been unable to call the National People's Congress into session, to draw up and enact the new constitution or elect the head of state for years. These facts show that the Maoists in China are far from being in a secure position and that the broad mass of the people

put up fierce resistance to their policy. The Soviet national daily *Pravda* observed on December 5, 1971, that "undoubtedly, the communists, workers and all the working people of China will find enough strength to return to the road of close unity with the fraternal socialist nations and ensure the success of the great cause of socialism in the People's Republic of China."

And it is with this in mind that the genuinely progressive forces of the world bend their efforts. The same is true of the Soviet Communist Party and government. Their policy is aimed both at normalizing Soviet-Chinese relations, at fighting against Maoism both ideologically and politically, and at opposing the splitting activities of the Chinese leaders in the socialist world, the liberation and youth movements.¹

Young people in the socialist countries and progressive youth the world over are confident that the Chinese youth will be able to stand up to the Maoists, reject their anti-socialist policy and join the ranks of the world democratic youth to work for peace and social progress everywhere.

¹ See the Report of the General Secretary of the CPSU CC L. I. Brezhnev on December 21, 1972. *Pravda*, December 22, 1972.